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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
SCM LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. . ] 
WATKINS & FABER, and 
WALTER P. PABER, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19172 
COMBINED PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
Because W. Chris Wicker, who tried the case, now 
practices in Reno, Nevada, and Brian W. Burnett, who handled 
the appeal, is now employed by the Utah State Attorney General, 
Walter P. Faber, Jr., a sole practitioner, Pro Se, and as 
the sole remaining member of Watkins & Faber, files this 
Combined Pe.tition for Rehearing and Motion to Amend Pleadings 
to Conform to the Evidence. 
The principal legal ground for rehearing and motion 
to amend to conform to the evidence is that this Court should, 
pursuant to Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
grant judgment to Watkins & Faber because of the undisputed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"
2
" 
evidence of mutual mistake by the parties who signed the 
written lease in the belief that other adjacent space then 
occupied by a third party on a month-to-month basis would 
be available to Watkins & Paber within six months after 
the lease was signed. This document combines the requests 
because common elements apply to both the petition and motion. | 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4 
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled> 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
I 
Although the theory of mutual mistake was not raised at 
trial or initially on appeal^ when Justice Zimmerman asked 
about mutual mistake during oral argument, it became obvious 
i 
that the theory of mutual mistake applied to the case and 
that such theory had up to that time been overlooked by 
counsel. The fact that a legal theory or defense has not 
i 
been discerned by counsel at trial does not prohibit the 
granting of judgment by the Supreme Court under Rule 54(c) 
if the evidence was presented. Rule 1 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure provides that the Rules apply to the 
Supreme Court as well as to the trial courts. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has previously considered 
the application of Rule 54(c) to the trial courts. See 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 
(Utah 1983); Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction Company, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984); Tebbs, Smith & Associates 
v. Brooks, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1986). The Utah 
Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the question 
whether the Supreme Court should grant relief based on the 
evidence received by the trial court, even though the parties 
had not presented to the trial court an applicable legal 
theory which was first discerned during argument before 
the Supreme Court. 
Under such circumstances, appellate courts in 
other jurisdictions have rendered judgment under Rule 54(c) 
even though the applicable theory was not recognized until 
the case was before the appellate court. In Massachusetts 
Bonding & Insurance Company v. New York, 259 P.2d 33 (2d 
Cir. 1958) .the court reversed the trial court and held that 
the United States was entitled to a priority claim pursuant 
to a theory which was presented for the first time to the 
appellate court. The United States had presented its case 
at two previous evidentiary hearings and had not argued 
to the referee at the first hearing or to the district court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
at the second hearing that the United States was entitled 
to a priority claim based upon a lien under the Internal 
Revenue Code. The appellate court allowed the theory and 
stated: 
[A]s Rule 54(c) F.R.Civ.Proc., points out, it 
is the courtfs responsibility to award relief \ 
required by the facts on any proper ground, 
regardless of the theories urged by the parties. 
Thus on numerous occasions . . . we, as well as 
other courts, have granted relief on legal 
theories not presented by the parties to the 
district court. 259 P.2d g 40. < 
In a similar case, United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51 (1958) 
the United States Supreme Court affirmed recovery by the 
United States on a lien theory never presented to the i 
district court but granted by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals in modifying the judgment of the district court. 
See, Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 732 P.2d 1238 (5th Cir. J 
1984); Industrial Dev. Bd. of Section, AL v. Fugua Industries, 
Inc., 522 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1975). 
The holdings in the above cases are consistent 
with the stated purpose of Rule 54(c) which is: 
. . . to [allow] relief to be given that 
is consistent with what is shown to be necessary 
to compensate the parties or remedy the situation 
without regard to the constraints of the antiquated 
and rigid forms of action. 
10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d § 2662 at 133 (2d Ed. 1983). The Eighth Circuit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court of Appeals stated the philosophy underlying Rule 54(c) 
as "the essentials of due process and of fair play. They 
assure to every person his day in court before judgment 
is pronounced against him." Sylvan Beach, Inc. v. Koch, 
140 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1944). 
Professor Moore states that: 
Rule 15 provides liberally for amendment of 
pleadings and supplemental pleadings to the end 
that litigation may be disposed of on the merits. 
Rule 54(c) continues the story by providing that, 
except as to a judgment by default which shall 
not be different in kind from or exceed the amount 
prayed, every other final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party in whose favor it 
is rendered is entitled. 
6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, MooreTs Federal Practice, 
§ 54.60 at 54-293 (2nd Ed. 1986). The benefits of Rule 
54(c) are available to both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Id. at § 54.62 pg. 54-315. 
In the instant case, this Court pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure can and should grant relief 
to defendant from the agreement because of the mutual mistake. 
As shown above, this Court has the responsibility to grant 
relief to defendant pursuant to the theory of mutual mistake 
even though this theory was not presented to the trial court 
and was first mentioned by one of the members of the Supreme 
Court. The only requirement is that the evidence was presented 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to the trial court as occurred in this case. Included 
in the Addendum hereto are pages from the trial transcript 
identifying such evidence. I 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that the 
parties signed the lease on the mutual understanding that 
IML was going to vacate the additional space needed by i 
defendant and that the lease would not have been signed 
by Watkins & Paber without that promise. When IML did not 
vacate the space as understood and relied on by the parties, ^ 
the fact of mutual mistake was established. 
In Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Products, 
Inc., 695 P.2d 409, 411-412 (Id. Ct. App. 1984) the Idaho * 
Court stated that "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, 
at the time of contracting, share a misconception about 
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they base their '' 
bargain." See Mat-Sue/Blackard/Stephan & Sons v. Alaska, 
674 P.2d 1101 (Alaska 1982); Gardner v. Meiling, 572 P.2d 
1012 (OR 1977). i 
In the instant case the evidence is undisputed 
that there would have been no agreement except for the 
assumption relied on by the parties. Therefore, pursuant 
to Rule 54(c) this Court should determine that the lease 
agreement between the parties was subject to rescission. 
( 
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There are also several other uncertainties in 
the CourtTs opinion that ought to be clarified. This 
Court's decision characterizes Watkins & PaberTs position 
as an attempt to modify a written lease. That does not 
accurately state Watkins & PaberTs argument which was that 
the failure to perform the unwritten promise was simply 
a failure of collateral consideration and was not an 
argument that the lease should have been modified to include 
the unwritten promise. The CourtTs decision does not clarify 
the question whether collateral consideration is required 
to be in written form under either the Parole Evidence Rule 
or the Statute of Frauds. For example, the situation of 
collateral consideration may be described as a case wherein 
two friends are negotiating a written contract concerning 
a particular commercial transaction and to overcome the 
reluctance by one party to sign the contract, the other 
orally promises to give the reluctant party a paid trip 
to Europe within six months, but after the signing reneges 
on his oral promise. It is not unusual that such a promise 
would not be included as a written provision of the contract 
between friends but would be collateral consideration, the 
failure of which would allow rescission. That is the 
essence of the situation in this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In addition, the Court's opinion does not treat 
the irreconcilable conflict between two jury instructions, 
one of which required the finding of and full performance 
of a detailed oral contract before the written lease could 
begin even though the required performance of the so-called . 
oral contract was not to have been performed until six months 
after the beginning of the lease term. Those irreconcilable 
instructions wrongly required the jury to return the verdict , 
that it did. That point should be resolved by this Court. 
This Court should grant the relief requested or 
remand this matter for entry of judgment in favor of Watkins , 
& Paber on the grounds of mutual mistake and issue an order 
under Rule 15(b) that the pleadings be amended to conform 
to the evidence. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(A JOJMA /\ ^raluj. (Is. 
WALTER P. PABER, JR., Pro Sf 
and for Watkins & Paber 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, JUDGE PRESIDING 
oOo 
SCM LAND COMPANY, 
vs. 
WATKINS & FABER and 
WALTER P. FABER, JR., 
Plaintiff, ) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. C81-8870 
TRIAL ON APPEAL 
Thursday, February 17, 1983 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff; 
For the Defendants 
HENRY K. CHAI II, ESQ. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Phone: (801) 521-9000 
W. CHRIS WICKER, ESQ. 
WATKINS & FABER 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 486-5634 
s-rx 
••W V - '^'~ s-*--'/ 'f- ^HARYN KELLY, CSR #134 
W ' . ^ ^ / ^ ^ M ^ f f i c i a l n a e p ^ r t a i r 
^tfjfc** U< m ij E 
^V 7T 
^ £2ufi £«:**«» E^adLlSS&k»r# m 
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1 .A Walter P. Faber, Jr., 2102 East 33rd South, 
2 Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3 • Q Where are you now employed? 
4 A Watkins & Faber. 
5 I Q What is Watkins & Faber? 
6 A It's a law firm. 
7 Q What is your position with Watkins & Faber? 
8 A I am the managing partner. 
9 THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Wicker; Why don't you get 
10 ' right to the point. If the jury were here and this was your 
11 I case in chief that all might be helpful. But I know Mr. Fabejr 
12 and I know his background, and I know what this case is 
13 I about. So why don't we get right to the meat of the case. 
14 MR. WICKER: Okay. 
15 THE COURT: Meat of the issue, I should say. 
16 MR. WICKER: Okay. 
17 Q Drawing your attention to June of 1979, what was 
18 the status of the Watkins & Faber lease in the Newhouse 
19 Building? 
20 A It was due to expire on June 30th, 1979. 
21 Q Now, at that time did Watkins & Faber intend to 
22 renew a lease for space in the Newhouse Building? 
23 A The answer is yes or no. 
24 I Q What do you mean by "yes or no"? 
25 | A We had not enough room at that time. We needed 
f>1fk 
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two or three more offices. And when I talked with 
Mr. Swinton, who was then the building manager for Mr. 
Fischer, about it, I told him that we had to have more space 
if we were going to stay in the building. So the question 
was whether we could have more space on the sixth floor or 
whether we'd have to move. 
.... i . . . . . . _ . 
Q When you approached Mr. Swinton with that idea 
what was his response? 
MR. CHAI: Your Honor, I am going to, for the record, 
make my objection on hearsay, parol evidence, statute of 
frauds. 
THE COURT: Well, I understand. You don't need to 
make any objections. 
MR. CHAI: Okay. 
THE COURT: Just save that for when the jury's here. 
MR. CHAI: Okay. 
THE COURT: This is just an attempt to determine 
whether or not your objection is well taken. 
MR. CHAI: Okay. 
THE COURT: Proceed, Mr. Wicker. 
MR. WICKER: Okay, Your Honor. When I am talking to 
Mr. Faber and speaking of him and using the word "you", I 
am referring to Mr. Faber and the firm Watkins & Faber, if 
that1s all right. 
THE COURT: All right. 
*"* ' > Ak Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Q (By Mr. Wicker) What was Mr. Sainton's response 
when you raised the idea of the need for more space? 
A Well, we discussed the fact that I.M.L. was 
on a i 
floor 
floor 
nonth-to--month te 
and that I.M.L. 
shortly and that 
nancy on 
was going 
the 
to 
additional i 
ba 
be 
spa 
lance 
movi 
ce on 
of th 
rig to 
the s 
Le sixth 
the eleventh 
ixth floor 
would be available. 
He thought it could be worked out, and we then 
arrived at a rental figure for the then present space in 
606 Newhouse Building. 
Mr. Swinton left and, I think several days later, 
came back with a proposed lease. And I told Mr. Swinton at 
that time that I wouldn't sign the lease until I had a 
definite promise of the additional space on the sixth floor. 
Q At th^t time what was Mr. Swinton1s response? 
A He didn't think there would be any problem, but 
that he couldn't make that decision, he'd have to contact 
the building owner, and the building owner, Mr. Fischer, 
would have to make the decision. 
Q Did you ever have occasion to speak to Mr. Fische 
about the need for more space? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that? 
A I spoke to him about it two times in the first 
part of July of 1979. 
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18 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
Q What was the substance of the first conversation?) 
A I think the first one, as I — 
Q I might ask you first, excuse me, who was present} 
and where did the conversation take place? 
A The conversation took place in the hall, out in 
the sixth floor hall. Mr* Swinton and I think Mr. Fischer 
were coming up to see me, and I was leasing, or something, 
at that time. 
Q And what was the substance of the conversation? 
A I told them that we, Watkins & Faber, had to 
have a promise of the 
floor or we'd have to 
said that would be no 
i _ , 
additional office space on the sixth, 
move from the building. Mr. Fischer 
problem, he'd promise the office space 
Q Was there anything else said in that conversation)? 
A Yes. We talked about what portion of the sixth 
floor we'd take, and I said we'd take — we couldn't be 
exact, because we were talking about putting a new entryway 
in the hall, across the hall on the sixth floor, so that 
Watkins & Faber would take what would be the northwest 
corner of the floor there. 
That would be a big corner office, a little 
office, and I think there were two other offices close. And 
then we'd have to put just one little partition across the 
hall in the space that I.M.L. was then occupying so that we'd 
end up with three offices, I believe, and at that time a 
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1 little storage room that was there at the end on 606, and 
2 we'd put a new partition across the main hall on the sixth 
3 floor. 
4 Q At that first conversation with Mr. Fischer 
5 was there any discussion of time element involved? 
6 A Yes. I asked him when it would be available. 
7 j He said that it would be available within two or three 
8 I months, he thought, but no later than the end of December, 
9 I 1979. 
10 I Q Again, in the first conversation with 
H | Mr. Swinton was there any discussion of rental rates or 
12 j anything of that nature? 
13 : A The rental rate for new space would be the going 
14 j rate. That was whatever they were renting space for at that 
15 time, which would be at the end of December, '79, 
16 Q Was that all the substance of the conversation, 
17 I or was there anything else discussed? 
18 A I think that was all except that either I said 
19 I'd be back in a little while or they said they'd be back in 
>0 a little while. 
H In any case, we met later in my office. 
!2 Mr. Swinton and Mr. Fischer came in. 
3 Q When was that? 
4 A I can't remember if it was that same day, but 
5 I think it was a few days later. Because something happened 
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that we couldn't get together. But it was on the 9th day of 
July when we finally got together. And Mr. Swinton and 
Mr. Fischer came into the office. 
Q When you say the office, are you referring to 
your office at Watkins & Faber? 
A In the office at Watkins & Faber, in my office. 
Q Was there anybody else present at that time? 
A Yes. Mr. Jim Arrowsmith. 
Q What was the substance of the conversation at 
that time, on July 6th? 
A We talked about whether I.M.L. would be moving 
and how their problems were going on the eleventh floor. 
Because 
to 
tei 
the 
lancy 
preside 
I 
el< 
. 
nt 
.M.L. 
sventh 
And I 
intended 
floor. 
talked 
to vaca te 
They were 
•vith Mr. 
of I.M.L., about it, 
Gl 
and 
the sixth floor and move 
on a month-to-
enn 
he 
Goodrich, 
said that 
-month 
the vice 
they were 
proceeding. 
If I may just state an aside here about the 
eleventh floor, the eleventh floor had been the offices of 
Samuel Newhouse. The hardware in there, as I recall it, is 
gold plated or something. They had mirrors all over and some 
very ornate wood. And I believe I.M.L. was trying to work 
that into whatever they were doing. But they had carpet up 
there and had done some other things. They were working on 
it. 
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Anyway, as we talked this over with Mr. Fischer, 
at that time I told him — At least, it sat on my desk for 
two weeks. And I told him I would not sign it unless we 
had the definite promise, and we had to have the date. 
Because Reed Watkins was on sort of a time basis at that 
time and Mr. Barry Bergen was a new associate who was coming. 
And all of the offices that we had then were completely used, 
and we were having two attorneys operate out of our supply 
room that we were trying to use as an office. 
I told that to Mr. Fischer and Mr. Swinton at 
that time, that we had to have the space and the promise 
it. He said at that time again that it would be done by 
end of December, 1979, that we would then sign a written 
lease for the additional space at the going rate. And I 
said okay. So I then signed the lease, and I think that 
of 
the 
Mr. Swinton had previously signed it. We took it out to my 
secretary, Miss Thurgood, who then notarized the lease, both 
signatures. 
MR. WICKER: Your Honor, is there any need at this 
point to identify the lease that's been admitted as an 
exhibit? 
THE COURT: No. I don't believe so. 
Q (By Mr. Wicker) Insofar as the promise of 
Mr. Fischer that you've testified to, why did you not get 
that promise in writing? 
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A Well, he said it would take place within a six 
month period, by the end of December, 1979. I expected it 
to take place, and we would have executed a lease within 
that period. 
Q Would Watkins & Faber have executed the renewal 
lease for space in the Newhouse Building without the promise 
of the additional space? 
A No. 
MR. WICKER: If we make take an aside at this point, 
Your Honor, the rest of our testimony would go to the idea 
as to whether, when December, '79 came to pass, the space 
was not offered, why at that time Watkins & Faber did not 
file some sort of action to get the space or take a specific 
action at that time. 
THE COURT: Well, all we are talking about now is we 
are doing this proffer to determine whether or not Mr. Faber1 
testimony is admissible, and that's all we are talking about. 
We are talking about only the conversations that he had with 
Fischer and Swinton. So if that concludes your direct exam-
ination on that point, we will allow Mr. Chai to cross. 
Q (By Mr. Wicker) Mr. Faber, were there any more 
conversations with Mr. Fischer or Mr. Swinton that bear on 
the oral promise of adjacent space? 
A Well, I had talked with Mr. Swinton prior to that 
a number of times. This would be before the end of June, 
*-> * 
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(Discussion off the record.) 
MR. WICKER: Your Honor, at this point this is all the 
questions I have of Mr. Swinton. 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine, Mr. Chai. 
MR. CHAI: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHAI: 
Q I've got kind of a sore throat. So if you don't 
understand what I say, tell me. 
h I do, too. 
Q Mr. Swinton, you've never worked for SCM Land 
Company, have you? 
A No. 
Q SCM Land Company was not involved at the time 
these conversations with Mr. Fischer about release of Suite 
606 took place? 
A No. 
Q The statement you heard from Mr. Fischer that 
you referred to earlier in the hall, you recall what we are 
talking about here? 
A Yes. 
Q Didn' t Mr. Fischer say that when I.M.L. moved 
foe would let Watkins & Faber have that space? 
A Yes. 
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1 Q I.M.L, never moved/ did they? 
2 A Not to my knowledge. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
3 Q And you never told Watkins & Faber that if they 
4
 stayed you would evict I.M.L. from the sixth floor to give 
5 Watkins & Faber the space? 
6 A I did not. 
7 Q And Mr. Fischer in your presence never said that? 
8 I A Not in my presence. 
Q This additional space that you indicated 
Mr. Fischer spoke about, how long was that space supposed 
to be available? 
A I am sorry? I didn't get the question. 
Q The additional space other than 606 for Watkins 
& Faber, did Mr. Fischer ever say how long they could have 
that space when it was leased? 
A (No response.) 
Q Do you understand my question, sir? 
A No. I don't know that he did. Are you referring 
to when they got the additional space how long they would 
have it? 
A Yes. 
A No. I think that would have been negotiated 
at the time they took it over. 
Q And Mr. Fischer in your presence never indicated 
who would pay for any remodelling costs that were necessary? 
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1 during that conversation? 
2 A Yes. 
3 J Q What was said? 
PAhctJ Mr. Fischer asked me if I was ready to sign the 
5 lease, and I said, "No, not unless we have a promise of the 
< r i . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • - ' i i • ' - - • • -
6 I space next door." And he said that that was no problem, 
ft I '-I I I. 
7 [
 xthat he would promise the space next door. 
8 We walked down, and in fact went in the offices 
9 of I.M.L. on the corner. That would be the northwest corner 
10 of the Newhouse Building. We looked at the space, talked 
11 about a little partition across the interior hall in the 
12 I.M.L. space. We talked about a place where we could put a 
13 partition; that is, an entry partition, across the main hall 
i 
i 
14 I on the sixth floor so that would be the entry into Watkins 
15 & Faber space when new space was given to us. 
16 Q Did you discuss anything more in regard to 
17 rental rates? 
18
 A Yes. He said it would have to be at the going 
19 rate, and I said that would be fine. I asked him whether 
20 I that would be, and he said, "I.M.L. is on a month-to-month 
21 [ tenancy. They are going to be moving to the eleventh floor 
22 shortly, and you can have that space at that time." And I 
23 said, "Well, I have to have a definite time as to when we 
24 would have it." Because we had attorneys at that time who 
25 were sharing an office 'cause we just didn't have enough 
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space. We needed three more, and I told him and Mr. Swinton 
that. 
Mr. Fischer said that we could have the space 
- — — — — — - — - — — — — • — — • 
pn the end no later than December 31st, 1979. I said okay. 
But for some reason, and I can't recall the reason now, we 
did not go into my office at that time. However, --
MR. CHAI: Your Honor, I would object. I don't believ^ 
hefs answered the question. He's answered the question 
earlier. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Wicker) Do you have any recollection of 
any later conversations with Mr. Fischer? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q When did that occur? 
A That occurred on July the 9th, 1979. 
Q Where did that conversation take place? 
A. It took place in my office. 
Q Who was present? 
A Mr. Swinton, Mr. Fischer, Jim Arrowsmith. He's 
a partner in the law firm of Watkins & Faber. 
Q Would you in substance tell us what was said 
during that conversation? 
A Yes. We talked about the space next door, talked| 
about I.M.L. moving, basically the same thing that occurred 
in the prior conversation, and Mr. Fischer said that I — 
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or, Watkins & Faber — could have that space by December 
31st, 1979. 
» I told him that at that point in time was very 
important to me. We had hired a new associate who was due 
to come, and we already had people sharing what was then our 
supply room as an office. He said that was find and I said 
okay, only on that basis will I execute the lease. 
I executed the lease and took the lease out to 
the front office where my secretary was. She notarized both 
Mr. Swinton's signature and my signature, and Mr. Fischer 
and I shook hands and he walked out, and Mr. Swinton and 
Mr. Fischer and my secretary were all present at that time. 
And I think Mr. Arrowsmith was there. 
Q Would you have signed the lease if he had not 
made the promise of additional space? 
A No. 
Q Why did you not get that promise of additional 
space in writing? 
Because it was going to take place in less than 
six 
the 
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